

Treaty and its three pillars: the New START Treaty must be regarded as a first step in a process of nuclear arms reduction that would eventually include all types of nuclear weapons and prohibit the development of new ones; disarmament should be pursued based on the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility; the process of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies must be accelerated by, among other measures, enhancing negative security assurances; existing nuclear-weapon-free zones must be strengthened and new ones created; and progress should be made toward establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

8. Real progress must be made towards entry into

Weapons, and its system of safeguards was essential for the implementation of the Treaty, benefitting all States parties and creating confidence that facilitated the fullest possible international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Over the years, Estonia had contributed to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and benefitted from its projects.

22. Building a climate of confidence and trust was essential to achieving progress on total nuclear disarmament in a universal and inclusive manner. Such trust should be built through the demonstrated implementation of concrete disarmament measures by

37. **Mr. Dapkiunas** (Belarus) said that the Treaty on Non-Proliferation was essential to international security.

nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The year 2015 marked not only the twentieth anniversary of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but also the seventieth anniversary of the nuclear bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the light of those key milestones, the international community must consider whether it had indeed made every effort to avert the devastation of nuclear war, and must adopt measures to safeguard the security of peoples.

53. Although the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) contained an extensive action plan, that did not mean that States parties were satisfied with the progress made in the implementation of previous agreements or that confidence among States parties had been restored. In fact, most States parties remained seriously concerned about the lack of urgency and seriousness in respect of previous undertakings, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. The success of the current or any other Review Conference would be determined by the extent to which States parties fulfilled those undertakings.

54. Nuclear weapons were inhumane and had unacceptable humanitarian consequences, and it was inconceivable that their use could be consistent with international law under any circumstances. Nuclear disarmament was not only an international legal obligation, but a moral and ethical imperative. In that connection, South Africa welcomed the outcomes of the three international conferences that had been held on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons,

assuring compliance with the safeguards agreements of States parties. His delegation called for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. Such zones enhanced global and regional peace and security and strengthened the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

60. Peaceful nuclear cooperation and access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, one of the core objectives of the Treaty, could accelerate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and further the post-2015 development agenda. Indeed, the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology was of particular importance in attaining sustainable and accelerated economic growth in Africa. South Africa highly valued the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, which made a significant contribution to addressing the socioeconomic needs and sustainable development challenges of developing countries, and enabled the Agency to meet its statutory objective of accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to global peace, health and prosperity. The Programme must therefore be allocated adequate and predictable funding.

61. Lastly, his delegation had taken note of proposals to elaborate a common understanding of the withdrawal provision of article X and believed that a similar approach should be taken with regard to other articles of the Treaty. For instance, a systematic analysis of articles I and II could lead to a common understanding on issues such as nuclear-sharing arrangements, while an analysis of articles IV and VI could help determine whether the core objectives of the Treaty had been met and what remained to be done.

62. **Mr. Ahsan** (Bangladesh) said that his country condemned the use of nuclear energy for destructive purposes and deplored the fact that vast sums of money were spent on nuclear arms. It was important to remember, however, that nuclear energy could also be used peacefully to promote development. The current Review Conference must address both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation with equal importance and urgency, since the continued existence of nuclear weapons meant that there was an ever-present risk that, whether by accident or by design, they could be used; reducing the number of deployed weapons and lowering the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems was no substitute for their complete elimination.

63. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore fulfil, in good faith, their long overdue legal obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and comply with th

was increasingly being called into question. There had been only limited progress towards implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, particularly by nuclear-weapon States, while certain States steadfastly refused to accede to the Treaty. Discourse regarding the three pillars of the Treaty had become increasingly political, divisive and characterized by complaints of non-compliance and bias, while the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had been indefinitely postponed. As a result, there was growing mistrust between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It was therefore crucial that all States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty and fully comply with their Treaty obligations.

68. With regard to nuclear disarmament, despite ongoing engagement by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States on various issues, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a voluntary moratorium on nuclear detonations and the New START Treaty, little concrete progress had been made on the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nuclear-weapon States, some of which appeared particularly reluctant to contemplate substantive cuts to their nuclear arsenals. That would only reinforce the perception that those States believed that nuclear deterrence must remain an integral part of their long-term national security doctrines.

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74. Lastly, every State party to the Treaty enjoyed the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was important, however, that all States should reassure the international community of the peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes and adhere to relevant IAEA safeguards and norms. In that regard, Singapore warmly welcomed the recent agreement reached on the parameters of a joint plan of action on the Iranian nuclear programme, and hoped that follow-up negotiations would lead to a comprehensive agreement guaranteeing the exclusively peaceful character of that programme by the June 2015 deadline.

75. **Mr. Lasso Mendoza** (Ecuador), speaking on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), reaffirmed the Community's pride in being the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone to have been established in a densely populated area, through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The commitment of CELAC to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been confirmed from its very foundation, in 2011, at which time relevant Heads of State and Government had adopted a special communiqué on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The region had also been proclaimed as a zone of peace at its second summit held in Havana in January 2014.

76. He expressed deep concern at the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, a matter which should be addressed in every discussion on nuclear weapons, and welcomed the successful conclusion of the three conferences on that topic held in Norway in 2013 and Austria and Mexico in 2014. The conferences had highlighted, inter alia, that nuclear weapons were a serious threat to security and development; that no State or international organization had the capacity to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance in case of a nuclear blast; and that the detonation of nuclear weapons, whether by accident or by design, was an ongoing risk.

77. In that context, CELAC supported the start of a multilateral diplomatic process for a legally binding instrument that would prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, within a multilaterally agreed time frame. To that end, he was in favour of the proposal made by Cuba at the third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument was necessary to achieving nuclear disarmament and would fulfil the obligation of all States parties under article

VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. In that connection, the Heads of State and Government at the CELAC summit held in Costa Rica in January 2015 had endorsed the pledge made by the Austrian Government following the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

78. He noted with regret that even as the United Nations was finalizing the post-2015 development agenda, nuclear-weapon States continued to invest heavily in maintaining and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear disarmament was a socioeconomic imperative for the international community; he urged nuclear-weapon States to allocate more resources to developing countries for the promotion of peace and sustainable development.

79. CELAC remained firmly in favour of the full, balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the three main pillars of the Treaty – namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy – and, referring to article VI of the Treaty, reiterated its concern at the failure of States to make progress towards nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the Treaty must be made universal: States

reservations prohibited by that Treaty, and to respect the denuclearized nature of the Latin American and Caribbean region, thus helping to prevent the introduction, and eliminate the possible use, of nuclear weapons against the countries of the region. CELAC regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and called for the conference to be convened as soon as possible.

82. The step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament had failed to achieve the objectives of the Treaty or the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or to initiate negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty). He called on all States, particularly those with nuclear weapons, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines, security policies and military strategies and to reduce the operational readiness of such weapons. Likewise, he urged those countries that had joined extended nuclear deterrence policies in the framework of military alliances to renounce their reliance on the nuclear weapons of other States for security.

83. The international community could not continue to tolerate the existence of nuclear weapons after banning all other weapons of mass destruction. Further, the indefinite extension of the Treaty agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not confer the right to indefinitely possess nuclear weapons. The current Review Conference must forge an ambitious path forward, taking into consideration the developments since the 2010 Review Conference. Simply rolling over previously agreed plans of action was unacceptable, especially given the lacklustre implementation of most of the disarmament-related actions.

84. **Mr. Raytchev** (Bulgaria) said that as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation had made the world a significantly safer place. The current security environment, however, was complex and it was important

fully supported the Agency and called upon any States that had not yet done so to negotiate and ratify additional protocols to their respective safeguard agreements. Bulgaria, as a State party that had developed nuclear energy for peaceful uses for over 40 years in compliance with the highest safety, security and non-proliferation standards, reaffirmed its support for the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to do the same.

90. His Government welcomed the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and increasing transparency, and urged all States parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety to fulfil the objectives of the Declaration. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime was an important framework for the development of nuclear applications for peaceful purposes. The States parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation should agree on a set of specific measures for ensuring the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions.

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